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Abstract 
User perceived quality is the most important aspect of 
Internet applications. After a single negative experience, 
users tend to switch to one of the other myriad of alterna­
tives available to them on the Internet. Two key compon­
ents of Internet application quality are scalability and reli­
ability. In this paper, we present the ﬁrst general-purpose 
mechanism capable of maintaining reliability in the face 
of process, machine, and catastrophic failures. We deﬁne 
catastrophic failures as events that cause entire clusters of 
servers to become unavailable such as network partition­
ing, router failures, natural disasters, or even terrorist at­
tacks. Our mechanism utilizes client-side tunneling, client-
side redirection, and implicit redirection triggers to deliver 
reliable communication channels. We capitalize on previ­
ous work, Redirectable Sockets (RedSocks), that focuses on 
Internet application scalability. RedSocks are communica­
tion channels enhanced with a novel session layer aimed 
at modernizing network communication. We modify Red-
Socks to create the ﬁrst fault tolerant socket solution that 
can handle all server-side failures. Our mechanism is com­
patible with NATs and Firewalls, scalable, application in­
dependent, and backwards compatible. 
1 Introduction 
It is crucial for Internet applications to be available 24-7. 
One study found that two-thirds of Internet users will rarely 
return to a site after a single bad experience [10]. Bhatti et 
al. [2] state, “Users have too many web sites that they can 
use as alternatives if they are either refused entry to one site 
or are given particulary slow service.” For some popular 
web services, a single server failure can result in tens of 
thousands of lost customers. 
To achieve 24/7 availability, Internet applications need 
to be scalable and reliable. The most popular solution to 
scalability is to construct multiple clusters of commodity 
servers and route incoming requests to them via a mechan-
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ism such as DNS Round Robin [3] or URL-rewriting [8]. 
L4 or L7 switches are then used for intracluster load bal­
ancing. No standard solution exists for making Internet ap­
plications reliable, but researchers have proposed a number 
of ideas [1, 12, 13, 9]. One reason for the lack of a standard 
solution for reliability is the tension that exists between re­
liability and scalability. Scalable systems are more complex 
or introduce central failure points which increases the vul­
nerability of the server system. At the same time, overly 
cautious failover mechanisms directly affect system scala­
bility by increasing server response latency. 
Current approaches to Internet application reliability fall 
into two categories. The ﬁrst category, connection redirec­
tion, insures new connections reach a healthy server. Both 
DNS and network switches, such as Cisco’s LocalDirec­
tor [4], can be conﬁgured to incorporate server health infor­
mation in their connection routing. Connection redirection 
complements the second category, communication fault tol­
erance. The goal here is to allow existing communication 
channels to persist in the face of machine failure. Most so­
lutions use primary-backup or log-based recovery. 
However, no solution addresses catastrophic failures. 
We deﬁne catastrophic failures as failures that completely 
block all communication from the current server cluster to 
the client. These failures can result from accidently cut 
transmission lines, router hardware failures, natural disas­
ters, or even terrorist attacks. After a catastrophic failure, 
only the client and a route to an alternate server cluster ex­
ists. From this, the existing communication channel must 
be reconnected to an alternate cluster and all communica­
tion state and associated application state reconstructed. 
We deﬁne a fault tolerant socket as a communication 
channel between two applications, typically a client and a 
server, that persists in the face of a process, machine, or 
catastrophic failure. In Figure 1, we illustrate where failures 
can occur along a communication channel and put them into 
two categories: server-side and client-side. Attempts in in­
creasing server application reliability often target process 
(A) and machine (B) failures. Using a redundant router 
handles an error at the entry point (D) to the Internet ap-
plication. Cut cables or earthquakes are examples of events 
that can cause the complete failure of server clusters (C) and 
associated entry points (D). There are two types of failures 
that occur in the Internet outside the server’s administra­
tive domain. The ﬁrst are errors that can be circumvented 
via normal IP routing recovery (E). The second (F) occurs 
when there is no alternative path from the client to the origin 
server cluster. We categorize failures at points A through F 
as server-side errors. Fault tolerant sockets must handle all 
server-side failures. Client-side failures (H, I, and J in Fig­
ure 1) are beyond the scope of Internet server applications. 
Put another way, fault tolerant sockets persist as long as the 
client does. 
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Figure 1. Various failure points along a 
client/server communication channel. 
To handle server-side errors, a failover mechanism must 
be able to detect that a failure occured, recover in-ﬂight 
data, construct a new communication channel to an oper­
ational server, and provide a method to synchronize com­
munication and application state. It must do this in a scal­
able way to be practical. Last, it must be compatible with 
methods for handling new connection redirection and be ap­
plication independent. 
One way to implement fault tolerant sockets is to use 
an existing intra-cluster mechanism and make it an inter-
cluster mechanism. This involves relaying network packets 
between clusters for every network packet received from a 
client. This transaction must complete before responding to 
the client. This exasperates the scalability problem. With 
this type of solution, you minimally double the amount of 
trafﬁc seen in individual clusters and increase the server re­
sponse time by the roundtrip latency between clusters. We 
do not explore this method. 
In this paper, we present our implementation of fault tol­
erant sockets. We propose a method that relies on client-
side support. Client-side support consists of a redirec­
tion mechanism (client-side redirection), a method to detect 
communication channel errors to trigger redirection (im­
plicit redirection triggers), and data synchronization (client-
side tunnelling). We ﬁrst introduced the idea of client-side 
support in [7] where we applied it to connection redirec­
tion. We developed RedSocks which uses our session-layer 
protocol, the Endpoint Operation Protocol (EOP), that al­
lows a server to redirect connections in a ﬂexible, scalable, 
and application independent way. In this paper, we augment 
EOP to allow RedSocks to provide communication fault 
tolerance. Our solution is client transparent, compatible 
with NAT’s and Firewalls, backwards compatible with nor­
mal sockets, application independent, handles catastrophic 
failures, and works with high-performance Internet appli­
cations. 
In Section 2, we present our fault tolerant socket solu­
tion. We follow with a discussion on the details of our im­
plementation. We present experiments, in Section 4, that 
demonstrate the efﬁcacy of fault tolerant RedSocks. We 
conclude with a presentation of related work and some part­
ing thoughts. 
2 RedSocks Fault Tolerance 
We have extended BSD sockets with our session layer 
protocol, EOP, that generates redirection events and en­
ables endpoint redeﬁnition. We call such sockets Redi­
rectable sockets or RedSocks. We looked at explicit redi­
rection events in [6] to increase the scalability of internet 
applications. We now look at RedSocks and implicit redi­
rection events to construct fault tolerant sockets. 
2.1 Failover Semantics 
We describe the semantics of redirection in RedSocks 
through a simple example. As shown in Figure 2(a), a com­
munication channel exists between two nodes, A and B. 
An error at B generates an implicit redirection event that 
changes the “B” endpoint of the channel to C (see Fig­
ure 2(b)). C represents a node that may equal A, B or a 
completely different node. EOP responds to the implicit 
redirection event by creating a new channel between A and 
C, synchronizing application and communication state, and 
removing the channel between A and B as seen in Fig­
ure 2(c). In Figure 2, a lower-case letter in a box represents 
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Figure 3. Implicit Redirection Event Timeline 
a request and the corresponding upper-case letter represents 
the response to that request. 
2.2 Implicit Redirection Events 
Implicit redirection events are generated by errors on the 
communication channel and serve as triggers for failover. 
Detecting these errors is not trivial and is explained in Sec­
tion 3. Implicit redirection is enabled and conditioned via 
the setsockopt system call. We deﬁne three new EOP 
socket options — heartbeat, checkpoint, and failover list. 
The EOP heartbeat option starts a heartbeat mechanism, at a 
rate determined by the server, on the client side of the com­
munication channel. The heartbeat mechanism is necessary 
for detecting host failure or network partitioning, because 
normal TCP detection of these errors typically takes well 
over twenty minutes. The EOP checkpoint option buffers 
server application state at the client and is used to update 
the alternate server to which the client is directed. Alter­
nate servers are provided to the client-side EOP by the EOP 
failover list option. No failover can occur until this option is 
set by the server. The last component that enables implicit 
redirection is that the client side EOP layer buffers the last 
data sent and can resend this data, if necessary, to handle 
in-ﬂight data. 
Our form of failover has several appealing properties. 
First, our mechanism depends only on communication 
channel feedback, i.e. TCP errors, and eliminates the need 
for 3rd party health monitors prevalent in other solutions. 
Second, the mechanism directly handles state transfer and 
synchronization. Other solutions, see Section 5, often in­
volve dedicated backup servers or complex communication 
channel taps that constantly record packet trafﬁc. Finally, 
by buffering data at the client and being able to redirect 
across a WAN, ours is the only solution that handles catas­
trophic failures. 
Figure 3 provides a system call level view of host interac­
tions for the different implicit redirection cases. In Figure 3, 
a lowercase letter denotes a request, an uppercase letter de­
notes a reply, a rounded box represents EOP processing that 
is transparent to the client, and 0 indicates a null parameter. 
In addition, we use   to denote the fault tolerant list op­
tion,   to denote the heartbeat option, and   to denote 
the checkpointing option. The   option is shaded in the 
ﬁgure. If used, then the jagged line in the ﬁgure represents 
both process failures and network partitioning. Otherwise, 
it only represents process failures. 
Figure 3(a) gives the case where the server is not us­
ing the checkpoint option and the error is detected during 
a send system call at the client. Server 1 must set the   
socket option before accepting the connection. If the server 
does not, the connection will be vulnerable to errors until 
the option is set. The server can also set the   socket 
option at any time in order to update the list of alternate 
servers. This list, along with all other option settings, is 
passed to the client during the EOP handshake (see Sec­
tion 3). The client-side EOP is notiﬁed of a communication 
channel error via TCP error codes or the heartbeat option. It 
then picks an alternate server from the failover list, creates a 
new connection to this server, forwards the previous request 
y to Server 2, and then returns control to the client. Normal 
communication ensues. 
Figure 3(b) only differs from Figure 3(a) in that check-
pointing is used. Server 1 updates the checkpointed state as 
needed. This state usually reﬂects application layer state as­
sociated with serving requests on the communication chan­
nel, such as a ﬁle name and offset. The checkpointed state 
is buffered at the client as part of the session layer commu­
nication state and overwritten on each update. The error de­
tection and redirection at the client occur as before, except 
that the checkpointed data is forwarded to Server 2 arriv­
ing in an accept st parameter. The client again forwards 
the last request. Server 2 sends a reply to this request and 
continues to serve any additional requests. 
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) are the recv error counterparts 
of Figures 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. While the client 
is blocked in the recv system call, EOP detects the er­
ror, creates a communication channel to an alternate server, 
forwards the previous request, forwards any checkpointed 
data, and then continues to wait for a reply. The client has 
the capability to set an EOP socket option that will return 
an EREDO error instead of automatically buffering and for­
warding the previous request at failover. This allows for 
more control when the client is EOP-aware. 
The servers need to carefully handle data synchroniza­
tion in persistent storage with implicit redirection. For ex­
ample, in Figure 3(d) Server 1 could have accomplished 
various levels of processing on the client’s request before 
failing. If this processing entails updating a persistent store, 
Server 2 might repeat updates to this store causing data 
corruption. If such updates are possible, then the servers 
could commit updates after the request/response transac­
tions completes, have a rollback mechanism invoked when 
servers fail, or have a 3rd party mechanism to record the 
partial processing done that Server 2 can query. 
3 Implementation 
There are several different, complimentary strategies for 
implementing RedSocks. You can use a library, proxy, ses­
sion layer solution, or RedSocks can be directly incorpo­
rated into the application. In our implementation, we chose 
a session layer solution and include a TCP option to dis­
cover the protocol, so that it can be deployed incremen­
tally. Thus, machines can begin aggressively incorporating 
RedSocks and its functionality can be incrementally used as 
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peers follow suit. 
3.1 Environment 
We built our fault tolerant sockets in the Linux 2.4.16 
kernel, which implements BSD sockets that conform to ver­
sion 4.4BSD. All code is written in C and the kernel was 
compiled with egcs-2.91.66. 
3.2 Architecture 
The fault tolerant socket architecture, shown in Figure 4, 
is an extension of the architecture we used for RedSocks [7]. 
We discuss the EOP and transport layer changes necessary 
to implement our fault tolerant sockets. 
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Figure 5. The new EOP Header 
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Figure 6. EOP option formats 
3.2.1 Endpoint Operation Protocol 
We modiﬁed the EOP header to allow options. We use the 
header options to send the backup server list, heartbeat rate, 
and checkpointed application data necessary for our fault 
tolerant socket implementation. The new EOP header is 
given in Figure 5. The additional ﬁeld hlen is a 8-bit ﬁeld 
that provides the length of the EOP header plus the options. 
Figure 6 illustrates the general EOP option format and the 
speciﬁc format for sending a backup server list. 
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Implicit Redirection Time Flow Diagram Figure 7 
gives the time ﬂow diagram for an implicit redirection event 
that includes checkpointed state. B periodically check­
points its application data during normal communication 
with A. When  B fails, EOP receives communication chan­
nel feedback indicating an error which triggers redirection. 
First, EOP chooses an alternate server from the list provided 
at connection time1, connects to it, provides the check-
pointed data during the 2-way EOP handshake, and for­
wards the previous request. Communication between A and 
C proceeds normally. 
Endpoint Failure Detection On the client, the failure of 
the server-side endpoint is only detectable through errors 
reported by the transport layer. The EOP layer must capture 
all relevant error codes to know when to invoke the failover 
mechanism. The failure mechanism is essentially the Red-
Socks redirect function with two differences: The redirect 
function is invoked by error handling code on the client, not 
by a ”redirect” EOP header sent by the server, and its target 
is selected from the client’s backup server list, rather than 
being pulled from an EOP header. 
Table 1 depicts ﬁve different failure scenarios. It pro­
vides the type of error that is reported to the application, 
TCP’s response, and the fault tolerant action that should be 
taken for both process and machine failure for each sce­
nario. For network partition failures that separate interme­
diate routers, we rely on feedback from ICMP messages. 
Scenario I describes the errors that can occur during the 
ﬁrst connection attempt by the client. If an error occurs 
at this time, there is no failover action to be taken by the 
client. In other words, fault tolerance does not apply until a 
connection is established. 
Scenario II, which represents failures that occur during 
a client send, has two subclasses deﬁned for process fail­
1The use of the option that provides a alternate server list is not shown 
in the diagram 
LengthKind Unused E 
1 byte 1 byte 2 bytes 
Figure 8. A new TCP option format for socket 
functionality discovery. 
ure. When the server process fails, the server-side kernel 
responds with a partial close of its end of the socket. The 
client still sends its message and the receipt of that message 
generates a TCP reset, denoted RST in the table, from the 
server-side TCP. If the RST arrives before the client calls 
recv, then we get case (a) in the table: the error is detected 
and the failover operation should be invoked. If the RST 
arrives after the client calls recv, then the client can only 
detect the sending of FIN which causes the recv call to re­
turn with zero bytes read. From the point-of-view of the 
client, this seems like a normal EOF occurring in the socket 
stream. To distinguish between these cases, we added an 
ENDTOKEN that the server sends, in the EOP header, on a 
normal close. If client receives a FIN but no ENDTOKEN, 
then the client knows it encountered a failure and should fail 
over. When the server-side machine fails during scenario 
II, the client encounters an extremely long ACK timeout 2. 
This delay is not transparent to the client and another solu­
tion is required to detect this condition. Our solution is to 
have EOP periodically send heartbeat messages. 
In scenario III, process failures are immediately detected 
and the client fails over. With machine failure, scenario III 
poses a more serious problem. No error conditions are gen­
erated and the client will block on the recv system call in­
deﬁnitely. Again, we require a heartbeat mechanism to han­
dle this situation. 
Last, scenario IV is the connection that occurs during the 
failover operation. When errors are detected the client tries 
the next server in the backup server list. If every server on 
the list is down, then the socket terminates and reports the 
error to the client. 
3.3 Deployability 
We enhanced our fault tolerant socket implementation 
by adding a negotiation mechanism that allows both end­
points to discover socket functionality. At connection-time, 
each end-point checks its peer and discovers whether EOP 
is supported and adjusts accordingly. We accomplished this 
by adding a new TCP option that sends the “conditioning” 
of the socket during the TCP 3-way handshake needed to 
form a connection. If no option arrives during the hand­
shake, then the remote end is not enabled with our enhanced 
socket features. Since TCP ignores all unknown options, the 
impact of sending this option to systems that do not support 
it is negligible. 
2Twenty three minutes for our Linux 2.4.16 test 
FAILURE 
SCENARIO 
PROCESS FAILURE MACHINE FAILURE 
FEEDBACK 
ACTION 
FEEDBACK 
ACTION ERROR TYPE TCP RESPONSE ERROR TYPE TCP RESPONSE 
I. Initial 
Connection 
connect: refused 
connection 
server: 
RST none 
connect: no 
route to host 
client: SYN 
3 times none 
IIa. Send recv: 
broken pipe 
server: FIN and 
RST before recv failover recv: no 
route to host 
ACK Timeout 
= 23 minutes 
(heartbeats) 
failover IIb. Send recv: returns 0 
no error 
server: FIN and 
RST after recv 
no end token?, 
failover 
III. Recv 
(partial data) 
recv: connection 
reset by peer 
both 
sent RST failover none none 
(heartbeats) 
failover 
IV. Failover 
Connection same as I same as I failover same as I same as I failover 
Table 1. TCP error messages and responses for given server failure scenarios with desired fault 
tolerant socket behavior. 
Figure 8 shows the format for this option. The kind ﬁeld 
identiﬁes the option. The length ﬁeld equals the total length 
of the option, which is four bytes in this case. The last two 
bytes comprise a bitmask indicating what features are sup­
ported. At this time, we only have one feature — EOP en­
abled (E). 
4 Experiments 
We ﬁrst measured the overhead of using our fault toler­
ant sockets when no failure occurs using two 400Mhz dual-
processor Pentium III machines. We measured the normal 
communication exchange between our custom client/server 
applications with our heartbeat mechanism enabled for dif­
ferent sizes of data to checkpoint. The checkpointing 
scheme we employ is to checkpoint application state before 
every send system call. This simulates the situation where 
every request is for a ﬁle to download which typically oc­
curs in ftp and web servers. We show the client latency for 
reply/request exhanges, varying in size from 100 bytes to 
32K, in Figure 9(a). To serve as a basis for comparison, we 
include the results for communication with heartbeats and 
checkpointing turned off; the line labeled “Normal” repre­
sents these results. As Figure 9(a) clearly shows, heartbeats 
and checkpointing add minimal overhead. 
For our failover overhead measurements, we used three 
400Mhz dual-processor Pentium III machines. The server 
provides the client with a list of alternate servers to failover 
to when the client connects via the EOP handshake. At 
some random point in the communication with the client, 
the server aborts the connection. When the client-side EOP 
detects the failure, it selects an alternate server from the 
failover list provided by the original server and opens a con­
nection to it. During the EOP handshake, the client-side 
EOP provides the alternate server-side EOP with the check-
pointed data, the number of bytes read since the check-
pointed data arrived, and any data leftover in the client’s 
send buffer. This information is passed up to the alternate 
server via the accept st system call. The alternate 
server parses this data and continues to serve the request. 
The entire transaction is transparent to the client. 
Figure 9(b) shows our results for this scenario for differ­
ent simulated ﬁle sizes and checkpoint data size. Again, 
we include the results of communication without failure, 
heartbeats or checkpointing for comparison; these results 
are represented by the line labeled “Normal” in the graph. 
We wanted to study the impact of failure on both large and 
small ﬁles. To simulate a large ﬁle transfer, we performed 
100 hundred send/recv exhanges of the sizes indicated 
by the x-axis of Figure 9(b). Simarly, we simulated a small 
ﬁle with 5 such exchanges. For a large ﬁles, the time as­
sociated with failover is amortized across 100 send/recv 
exhanges and thus exhibits less overhead than that experi­
enced by small ﬁles. 
5 Related Work 
Fault Tolerant RedSocks is the only application-
independent solution that handles catastrophic failures. We 
brieﬂy describe application-independent approaches that 
handle other server-side failures and place our work within 
the context of these approaches. 
The Stream Control Transport Protocol [5] proposes the 
notion of multi-homing, in which an end-point can be asso­
ciated with multiple IP-addresses. Upon a network failure, 
the protocol arranges for data to be sent over to an alternate 
network path to the same server endpoint. Our mechanism 
also handles network failure by allowing failover to an al­
ternate network path between the same server endpoint or a 
different one. 
HydraNet-FT [11] uses a redirector for detecting fail­
ures and re-mapping an existing connection to a secondary 
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server. The redirector is aware of all replicas, and redirects 
each client request to a primary and all its replicas. The 
system, thus, uses a primary-backup scheme. Our approach 
does not require dedicated replicas. 
Alvisi et. al [1] describe a fault tolerant TCP (FT-TCP) 
in which a failed TCP connection can be restored to a spe­
ciﬁc communication state after a server recovers from fail­
ure. FT-TCP is implemented by a wrapper that checkpoints 
connection state and data at a separate logger. During the 
recovery process, the wrapper and the loggers interact to 
bring the application to a speciﬁc state. Our recovery pro­
cess does not require servers to replay all previous commu­
nication events to rebuild communication and application 
state. 
Snoeren et. al [12] propose a connection failover me­
chanism to provide fault tolerance for a collection of Inter­
net servers. In this approach, each connection is associated 
with a set of LAN-connected servers. The servers periodi­
cally synchronize their connection states. Upon failure, the 
servers in the group contact the client, which then selects 
one of the servers to resume connection. Because the server 
resumes communication, the solution is not compatible with 
NATs or Firewalls. Our approach differs from [12] in that 
our notion of connection failover is client-centric. Once a 
connection fails, a client endpoint determines the server to 
which it should re-connect. This makes our approach com­
patible with both NATs and ﬁrewalls. 
6	 Conclusion 
Fault tolerant RedSocks bring reliability to Internet Ap­
plications. Ours is the ﬁrst, general-purpose solution that 
handles all server-side failures, including catastrophic fail­
ures, in a scalable manner. In future work, we plan to in­
corporate connection redirection, instream redirection, and 
fault tolerance to provide a single solution to Internet appli­
cation scalability and reliability requirements. 
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